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Public Reason as a Strategy for Principled
Reconciliation: The Case of Islamic Law and
International Human Rights Law
Mohammad H. Fadel*

I. INTRODUCTION

If the salient question of the twentieth century was race, first as manifested
in European imperialism and then in international decolonization and domestic
civil rights movements, the corresponding question of the twenty-first century
may very well be religion, particularly Islam. Even in the absence of September
1lth, several long-term global trends would have made it almost inevitable that
previously specialized debates on the compatibility of Islam and human rights
law would become an important concern to policymakers throughout the world.
Among these are (i) the revival in religious expression and assertions of religious
identity among all major religions, including Islam; (ii)the presence of large
numbers of Muslims in established democracies and major developing countries
aspiring to enter the club of advanced democracies (for example China, India,
and Russia); and (iii) the success of religiously-based political movements in
Muslim-majority states demanding greater Islamization of the state and society
and the corresponding retreat of secular politics.
Many, if not all, Islamic political movements have an ambiguous position
toward human rights law; they tend to endorse the concept as an abstract
principle while objecting to certain substantive provisions of human rights law.
This ambivalence is reflected in the policies of Muslim-majority states. Many of
these states ratify international human rights conventions but do so subject to a
reservation that, in the event of a conflict between provisions of the treaty and
Islamic law, the provisions of Islamic law control.' Indeed, relevant international

I

BA, University of Virginia, 1988; PhD, University of Chicago, 1995; JD, University of Virginia,
1999. Assistant Professor and Canada Research Chair for the Law and Economics of Islamic
Law, University of Toronto Facultv of Law.
This policy of ratifying an international convention, such as the Convention for the Elimination
of Discrimination Against Women ("CEDAW"), subject to an Islamic law reservation, has drawn
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instruments themselves have created a tension between human rights lawwhich is focused primarily on the individual-and cultural rights law which
recognizes the right of a state to act to protect its culture or way of life.
Moreover, the reluctance of many Muslim-majority jurisdictions to accede
without qualification to human rights instruments because of Islamic law creates
concern as to the willingness and ability of Muslim minorities to conform to the
domestic human rights standards of established democracies. This in turn
contributes to fostering domestic political movements in various democracies
that promote fear of Muslim immigrants as a subversive cultural and political
force.
Given these political realities, human rights advocates have to tread a
careful line in their approach to issues that potentially conflict with Islamic law.
On one hand, too categorical of an approach risks violating legitimate rights of
religious expression and contributes to an overall political climate in which the
political rights of Muslim individuals may be infringed upon equally by hostile
non-Muslim majorities or authoritarian regimes in the Muslim world resisting
calls for increased democratization on the argument that to do so would only
empower illiberal elements of their societies. Yet on the other hand, too
deferential an approach risks tolerating systematic violations of human rights
norms in Muslim majority jurisdictions or in multicultural societies with Muslim
2
minorities.

II. A RAWLSIAN APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW AND ISLAMIC LAW
This Article seeks to build on overlapping concerns of human rights law
and Islamic law in the hope of mapping out a principled approach to resolving
conflicts between contemporary human rights standards and accepted doctrines

the ire of human rights lawyers. See, for example, Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Internaionali'ng the
Conversation on Women's Rights, in Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and Barbara Freyer Stowasser, eds,
Islamic Law and the Challenges of Modernioy 133, 136 (AltaMira 2004) (stating that Arab countries
which adopt the CEDAW subject to an Islamic law reservation thereby "indicat[e] their
determination to adhere to nonconforming domestic standards'). See also Michael Schoiswohl,

2

The New Afghan Constitutionand InternationalLaw: A Love-Hate Affair, 4 Intl J Const L 664, 672 n 39
(2006) (mentioning various Muslim countries that have entered Islamic law-based reservations to
CEDAW).
For an excellent discussion of the problematic relationship that international human rights
organizations have developed with Islamic law, see Naz Modirzadeh, Taking Islamic Law Seriously:
INGOs and the Battle for Muslim Hearts and Minds, 19 Harv Hum Rts J 191, 193 (2006). For an
example of the impact the issue of Islamic law can have on Muslim minorities in jurisdictions
committed to multiculturalism, see Natasha Bakht, Were Muslim BarbariansReally Knocking on the
Gates of Ontario?. The Religious Arbitration Controver---Another Perspective, 40 Ottawa L Rev 67
(2006).
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of Islamic law.3 This strategy is based on concepts developed by John Rawls in
4 and argues that much of the
his seminal work Political'Liberalism,
current conflict
between the substantive norms of human rights law and Islamic law could be
resolved if human rights justifications were grounded in an overlapping political
consensus rather than in foundational metaphysical doctrines that are necessarily
controversial. In other words, I argue that it would be possible to resolve
conflicts between substantive human rights provisions and Islamic law if human
rights advocates and Islamic law advocates both agreed to observe the
limitations of "public reason." Public reason for Rawls is a term of art that refers
to a particular mode of reasoning that citizens use in their public deliberations
on constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice. Public reason limits
citizens to advance only such positions as they may justify on grounds that they
reasonably believe others could reasonably accept as free and equal could.'
For purposes of developing this argument, I assume that for most liberals
(individuals with commitments derived from the philosophy of Kant or Mill, for
example), deviations from an equality norm-so long as the deviation is
voluntary and rational from the perspective of the concerned individual-do not
raise a political concern, even if liberals might question the wisdom of such a
choice. Accordingly, a Muslim woman who would only consider marriage to a
Muslim male-based on her free religious conviction that marrying a nonMuslim spouse would be sinful, even if a Muslim male is permitted to marry
certain non-Muslim women-does not raise a concern for human rights law. It
is only when a state would prohibit her from marrying a non-Muslim on the
grounds that such a marriage is invalid under Islamic law that a human rights
violation occurs. An individual's voluntary and subjectively rational deviation
from an equality norm, moreover, may not be consistent with liberal notions of
personal autonomy. But, to the extent that such a deviation is driven by properly
motivated religious observance, the human right to free exercise of religion also
supports-and perhaps even requires-permitting such conduct, even if it
results in inequality that would violate human rights norms were such conduct to
be mandated by the state. Whatever the proper standard for restricting free
exercise of religion may be, it cannot be the case that the exercise of religion that
results in deviation from a secular norm of equality results in a per se violation

3

Obviously, the substantive content of both human rights law and Islamic law is dynamic, and
although one cannot preclude radical doctrinal change in either body of law, for purposes of this
Article, I will assume that the current rules in each system are stable or are only amenable to longterm change.

4

John Rawls, Polificalliberalism(Columbia 1993).

5

Id at xliv, 1.
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of human rights norms. Accordingly, liberals should be indifferent to the
existence of non-egalitarian outcomes-from the perspective of liberalism-in
civil society resulting from individual choice, so long as those choices are not the
result of state-backed coercion.
Similarly, I also assume that most Muslims are indifferent to any specific
legal regime so long as that legal regime does not compel them to undertake acts
that they subjectively deem sinful or prevent them from fulfilling the devotional
elements of Islam. Accordingly, Muslims should be indifferent to whether a state
enacts positive legislation mandating an Islamic vision of the good, so long as
the state gives Muslims the freedom to live in accordance with that vision.
While liberalism and Islam are philosophically incompatible as
comprehensive theories of the good, Rawls suggests that they nevertheless may
agree on enough basic political propositions such that their relationship is
characterized by an "overlapping consensus." An overlapping consensus exists
when individual citizens--despite their profound moral, philosophical and
religious divisions-are nevertheless able to endorse the basic political structure
of society for reasons that each finds morally persuasive within her own system
of moral, philosophical or religious commitments It is worth exploring this
possibility since the payoff would be qulte significant-the emergence of a truly
universal human rights regime, and the reduction in the scope and scale of
tensions between individual Muslims and the world order.
Elsewhere, I have argued that public reason is legitimate from the
perspective of Islamic theology, ethics, and law.8 Given that Islamic law in its
current form reflects the norms of a pre-modern legal culture, it must be
subjected to review for compatibility with the norms of public reason. But this
process should be no different from that which occurred in other jurisdictions
that transitioned from legal systems that recognized gender and legal hierarchies
to legal systems in which norms of non-discrimination largely prevail.
From the perspective of public reason, pre-modern Islamic law is
problematic because it permits (indeed, in many cases, mandates) discrimination
on the basis of religion 9 and gender.'" Moreover, in the case of the hudud
6

Likewise, I assume that liberals would not object to a newspaper publishing an advertisement by a
Muslim woman who seeks a spouse where the express terms of the advertisement are limited to
Muslim males.

7

See, for example, Rawls, PoliticalLiberalismat Lecture IV (cited in note 4).

8

Mohammad H. Fadel, The True, the Good and the Reasonable: The Theological and EthicalRoots of Public
Reason in Islamic Law, Can J Law & Juris (forthcoming 2008).

9

Non-Muslims under traditional Islamic law were tolerated, but were not given the same civic
tights as Muslims. In addition to being subject to a special tax, they also suffered some legal
disabilities, including the inadmissibility of their testimony in courts of law. Although some public
offices were open to non-Muslims, they could not, for example, serve as judges in Islamic courts.
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offenses,1 the substantive penalties that Shari'ah requires to be imposed, such
as amputation for theft and stoning for adultery, cannot be justified on the
grounds of public reason.' 2 The hudud raise particularly thorny problems since,
according to orthodox theological opinion, the state is obligated to apply these
punishments once the substantive elements of the crime have been proven."
Therefore, from a Rawlsian perspective, at least some rules of Islamic law
will have to be revised to meet the requirements of public reason. This
obligation to revise doctrine in order to make it compatible with public reason
also applies to international human rights law. In the case of the latter, though,
what needs to be revised is not so much substantive doctrine, but the
justification for the doctrines. To the extent that international human rights
norms are derived from metaphysical conceptions of personhood-especially
liberal conceptions of personhood-they will necessarily conflict with the
theological premises of not only Muslims, but also traditionalist adherents of
other theistic faiths, and therefore are impermissible justifications for the norms.
Instead, international human rights norms should limit themselves to polifical
conceptions of the person in order to increase the likelihood that Islamic
countries will endorse international human rights norms freely and without
reservation.

10

11

12

13

Islamic law facially violates contemporary notions of gender equality, in family law principally. It
should be noted, however, that there are other discriminatory norms in areas unrelated to gender.
For example, descendants of the Prophet Muhammad are forbidden under Islamic law from
receiving alms.
The hudud offenses consist of seven crimes-adultery/fornication, slander, theft, brigandage,
wine-drinking, apostasy, and rebellion-whose penalties are legally fixed and for which the state
lacks any enforcement discretion once the elements of the crime have been proven. See Robert
Postawko, Comment, Towards an Islamic Critique of CapitalPunishment, 1 UCLA J Islamic & Near E
L 269, 286-87 (2002).
Numerous modern Muslims have proposed theories that would justify departing from classical
doctrine regarding the necessity of the application of the hudud penalties. See, for example, Khaled
Abou El Fadl, The Place of Ethical Obligationsin Islamic Law, 4 UCLA J Islamic & Near E L 1, 11-12
(2005) (describing the decision of medieval jurists to treat the specified punishments associated
with the hudud as being immutable as "erroneous" and "unfortunate"). For purposes of this
Article, I assume that substantial numbers of Muslims-for the foreseeable future-will continue
to adhere to orthodox doctrine on this question, and, accordingly, the problem of hudud and
international law will remain salient.
As a practical matter, the issue of legal discrimination justified by appeals to Islamic law is a much
greater practical problem than that posed by the hudud, since only a handful of Muslim
jurisdictions continue to apply these penalties. Because of the categorical nature of the penalties,
and probably because they have come to symbolize Islam, however, many Islamic political
movements have made vocal demands for the application of these penalties as proof that the legal
system is Islamic. Accordingly, the problem posed by the hudud is already politically salient and
could become legally salient in an increasing number of Muslim jurisdictions in the future.
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In setting forth my arguments for how public reason would approach the
problem of reconciling Islamic law' 4 and international human rights law, I begin
with a brief discussion of rules of Islamic law that are already consistent with
public reason, and then proceed to those rules that may be in conflict with it.
The set of rules that may be in conflict with public reason are divided into three
categories: (i) permissive rules (for example, the right to own slaves or the right
of a man to marry more than one wife); (ii) mandatory rules with which
voluntary compliance could be consistent with the requirements of public reason
(for example, Islamic inheritance law); and (iii) mandatory rules that are
categorically repugnant to public reason (for example, the criminalization of
apostasy).
I will consider the extent to which international human rights norms or
justifications need revision in light of the limitations of public reason
simultaneously with my discussion of the Islamic rules of law. One category of
such Islamic rules represents rights that are either categorically repugnant to
norms of public reason or could be legitimately regulated or even proscribed
under the norms of public reason (for example, the right of males to have
multiple wives). Next, I will consider another category of rules that are
inconsistent with public reason, but could be reconciled without any revision of
Muslim theological or ethical commitments. If the Islamic rule is mandatory and
cannot be reconciled with the requirements of public reason without a revision
to Islam's theological commitments, it imposes on the believer an obligation to
act and thus does raise a question of conscience. Where this stands in contrast to
the merely permissive category of rules described above, I ask whether the
voluntary adherence by a Muslim to the Islamic norm-in contrast to state
application of that norm-would be consistent with public reason. This inquiry
inevitably entails a discussion of the extent to which public reason would permit
granting religious believers exemptions from otherwise valid laws. Finally, I wiH
explore whether there are any mandatory rules of Islamic law that are
categorically repugnant to public reason, and therefore require theological
revision.

14

Islamic law, for purposes of this Article, includes the rules of all historically recognized schools of
Islamic law, and assumes the legitimacy of talfq-the right of the legislator to pick and choose
rules from more than one school of substantive law. Accordingly, I assume that Islamic states that
include Islamic law as a source (or the source) of its positive legislation will usually begin with the
rule, regardless of the school in which it originates, that is closest to the norms of international
human rights law.
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III. RECONCILING ISLAMIC LAW AND INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW WITH PUBLIC REASON
A.

RULES OF ISLAMIC LAW THAT ARE CONSISTENT WITH

PUBLIC REASON
An exercise in reconciling Islamic law to public reason would be futile but
for the fact that the bulk of substantive Islamic law is generally consistent with
notions of public reason. For example, the legal doctrines set forth in the
numerous treatises that pre-modern Muslim jurists wrote describing the rules
governing the conduct of the state and the judiciary generally are consistent with
notions such as: (i) the government is the agent of the governed and therefore
exists to further the welfare of the ruled; (ii) individuals are rights-bearers whose
rights cannot be infringed without due process of law; (iii) mature individuals
have the legal capacity to direct their affairs autonomously without the
interference of the state or others; (iv) parties to judicial proceedings must be
given notice and an opportunity to be heard, a right that includes the right to
present evidence and impeach the other party's evidence; (v) judges must be
neutral and disinterested and are to rule based on evidence admitted pursuant to

general rules of evidence rather than their personal knowledge of the case;
(vi) government agents are subject to the law; and (vii) the government may not
take private property except for a permitted purpose and with compensation to
the owner.'5 Similarly, Islamic private law, while perhaps obsolete, is generally
non-discriminatory and therefore already consistent with public reason.16 This
much is, or ought to be, non-controversial.
Less well-known, perhaps, are rules of Islamic law that robustly protect
sexual privacy, 7 most notably the evidentiary hurdles related to the prosecution
15

16

17

For a general discussion of the structural features of Islamic law that make it conducive to such a
conception of government, see John A. Makdisi, The Islamic Origins of the Common Law, 77 NC L
Rev 1635, 1703-12 (1999).
A good example of the obsolescence of some rules of Islamic law is its proscription of many
contracts involving contingent payoffs, and for that reason does not recognize the validity of
commercial insurance. See Mahmoud A. El-Gamal, Islamic Finance: Law, Economics and Pracice 61
(Cambridge 2006). For the non-discriminatory nature of Islamic private law, see Fadel, The True,
the Good and the Reasonable at *88 (cited in note 8). This does not mean that historical or
contemporary Muslim societies were or are always successful in adhering to the models of legality
they set out for themselves; that is a different question from whether the rules themselves and the
commitments implicit in those rules are consistent with public reason.
See Muhammad b. Yusuf al-Mawwaq, 4 al-Taj wa al-ik/il li-mukhtasar khalil 104 (Dar al-fikr 1992)
(prohibiting the government from interrogating a woman found in the company of dissolute men
to determine whether she had engaged in sexual misconduct, although she could be punished for
a lesser crime on the grounds that the purpose of the law is to protect privacy). See also id at 497;
Ahmad b. Muhammad b. Ahmad al-Dardir, 2 al-Sharh al-saghir 483 (Dar al-ma'arif 1972-1974)
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of adultery.' 8 This principle also manifests itself in other areas of the law and
generally has the effect of enhancing the autonomy of women, particularly with
respect to their procreative lives. For example, the legal principle that "women
are the trustees of their wombs" operates to preclude judicial inquiry into
matters such as whether a pregnancy terminated as the result of an abortion or a
miscarriage, or whether a divorcee has completed her "waiting period," meaning
that (i) her first husband loses the right to remarry her without her consent
(including a new contract and new dowry) and (ii) she becomes free to marry
again. 9 This same principle also barred expert evidence as proof of penetration
in the case of a rape claim.20 This same principle has been invoked to deny a
husband's claim that his ex-wife aborted his child after their divorce, even in
circumstances where immediately after the divorce the wife had claimed
pregnancy. 2' Likewise, medical evidence to determine whether a bride was a
virgin at the time of marriage has been held not admissible in a suit brought by a
husband alleging that his bride was not a virgin. Furthermore, in the case where
a husband claimed that his bride had engaged in intercourse prior to the

(Mustafa Kamal Wasfi, ed) (a female's guardian, in connection with contracting her marriage, was
obliged to conceal any sexual misconduct of the bride).
18

19

20

21

See generally Seema Saifee, Note, Penumbras, Privay, and the Death of Morals-Based Legislation:
Comparing U.S. ConstitutionalLaw with the Inherent Right of Privay in IslamicJurnsprudence, 27 Fordham
Intl L J 370 (2003) (describing Islamic law's protections of privacy, particularly as relating to
private sexual conduct). See also Asifa Quraishi, Her Honorv An Islamic Critique of the Rape Laws of
Pakistanfrom a Woman-Sensilive Perpeclive, 18 Mich J Intl L 287, 295-97 (1997) (describing Islamic
law's according priority to privacy in prosecution of consensual adulterers).
See al-Mawwaq, 4 al-Taj at 104 (cited in note 17) (woman's statement regarding the termination of
her waiting period-whether by conclusion of three menstrual periods or by conclusion of
pregnancy, whether by miscarriage or delivery-is to be accepted by a court without the woman's
oath); Muhammad 'Illaysh, 4 Sharh minah aljalil 'ala mukhtasar al-'allama khalil 190 (Dar al-fikr
undated) (accepting a divorced woman's statement that her waiting period has concluded without
requiring her to swear an oath, after which her divorce is final and may remarry); 4 Ahmad b.
Ahmad al-Qalyubi, Hashiyat al-Qayubi wa 'Umayra 4 (Molvi Mohammed Bin Gulamrasul Surtis
Sons undated) (a woman's sworn statement regarding the termination of her waiting period
following divorce is to be accepted without additional prooo; Muhammad al-Khatib al-Sharbini, 3
Mughni al-muhta ila ma'rifat aifaZ al-muhtaj 339 (Dar al-fikr undated.) (same); Abu Yahya Zakariyya
al-Ansari, 2 Fath al-wahhab bi-sharh manhaj al-tullab 88 (Dar al-fakr undated) (same); 4 Hashiyat alJamal 'ala sharh al-manhaj (Chapter on Revocable Divorce) (included in the Enqclopedia of Islamic
Jurisprudence (Harf v 3.01 2002), available online at <http://feqh.al-islam.com> (visited Apr 21,
2007)) (same).
Abu al-Walid Sulayman b. Khalaf al-Baji, 5 al-Muntaqa sharh al-muwata 269 (Misr: Matba'at alsa'ada 1914) (the statement of a free woman claiming to have been raped is to be accepted by the
court even if she is examined by females who, after examining her, claim she is a virgin).
See Muhammad al-'Illaysh, 2 Fath al-'alial-malikfi al-fatwa 'ala madhhab al-imam malik (Chapter on
Torts and Misappropriation) (included in the Enclopediaof IslamicJurisprudence(cited in note 19)).
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marriage, he was subject to punishment as a slanderer, even if the marriage
contract represented that she had never been married. 2
Finally, upon attaining the status of a legal adult, a woman's right to marry
a husband of her choosing is not contingent upon the approval of her male
kin. 23 The right of women to control their bodies is even implicitly recognized in
the refusal of Islamic law to recognize any legal obligation for a mother to nurse
her child, except in circumstances where the life of the child is at risk.24 A
woman's right to bodily integrity is also reinforced by a rule allowing a wife to
sue her husband for compensation from injuries suffered at his hand, despite the
husband's nominal legal right to discipline his wife.25 Moreover, where a
husband and wife disagree as to the whether the husband beat the wife or
lawfully disciplined her, the law of evidence presumes the truth of the wife's
claim. 26
22

23

Al-Dardir, 2 al-Sharh al-saghir at 476 (cited in note 17); al-Mawwaq, 3 al-Taj at 490-91 (cited in
note 17). A-Hattab points out in his commentary, Mawahib aljail, that the evidentiary rule
governing this dispute-that the bride wins the case by swearing an oath-applies only on the
assumption that breach of a contractual representation of virginity results in an annulment of the
marriage, a rule that is itself controversial within the Maliki school. See Muhammad b.
Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Rahman al-Hattab, 3 Mawahib aljalil li-sharh viukhtasar Kha/il 490-91 (Dar
al-fikr 1992).
Indeed, it may be that it was the recognition of the contradiction between the robust protection
of the rights of adult women to choose their mate and the rule permitting fathers to marry off
their minor daughters that led 'Izz al-din b. 'Abd al-Salam, a prominent thirteenth century
Egyptian/Syrian jurist to justify-even though such a rule diminishes the child's autonomy
interests-the latter rule on the basis of necessity. 'Iz al-din b. 'Abd al-Salam, 1 Qawa'idal-ahkamfi
masalih al-anam 89 (Dar al-ma'rifa undated). Accordingly, the right of the power to contract
binding marriages for his children is recognized as an exception to the general rule of autonomy
in personal affairs.

24

Women may be contractually bound, however, in certain cases to nurse their children. Such an

25

obligation to nurse is an incident of the marital contract. In the absence of an express agreement,
the Malikis looked to custom, concluding that for most women, the implied term of their contract
required them to nurse. The contracts of wealthy women, however, were understood to lack such
a condition. In theory, at least, even poor women could contract out of the requirement to nurse
their children. Only in circumstances where the child refused the breast of available wet nurses
and would nurse only from his birth mother, was the birth mother legally obligated to nurse. This
obligation arises out of the duty to save the child's life, however, not out of the duties of
motherhood. In such a case, the mother was entitled to compensation for her labor, either from
the child or the father.
Al-Dardir, 2 al-Sharh al-saghir at 512 (cited in note 17) (stating that wife-beating is an assault and

26

entitles her to compensation and judicial divorce); al-Hattab, 4 Mawahib aljalilat 15 (cited in note
22) (stating that a wife whose husband has beaten her is entitled to compensation) and al-Hattab,
6 Mawahib aljalil at 266 (cited in note 22) (noting that the wife was entitled to special damages
(diya mughallaZa)); 'Illaysh, 9 Fath al-'ali al-malik at 138 (cited in note 21) (same).
Ahmad b. Muhammad al-Sawi, 2 Bughat al-salik i/a aqrab al-masalik on the margin of al-Dardir, 2
al-Sharh al-Saghir at 511 (cited in note 17) (where the spouses disagree whether the husband
exercised lawful discipline or committed abuse, the wife is presumed to be truthful unless the
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B. PERMISSIVE RULES OF ISLAMIC LAW AND PUBLIC REASON
Islamic law includes permissive rules, such as the right to own a slave, the
right of a man to marry more than one woman, and the qualified right of a
husband to discipline his wife, which contradict both the requirements of
international human rights law and public reason. Because such permissive rules
do not raise a question of conscience for a committed Muslim-as by definition
he is not obliged to invoke these permissive rights-elimination of these rights
would not appear to be problematic. 27 These three issues should be particularly
easy, since Islamic law has traditionally viewed both slavery and polygamy
unfavorably, even if legally permissible, and has viewed a husband's right of
marital discipline with discomfort.
Thus, Islamic law restricted the supply of slaves by first prohibiting the
enslavement of Muslims or non-Muslims who were permanent residents of an
Islamic state, even if such enslavement was pursuant to a contract and, second,
by presuming that individuals in the territory of an Islamic state were free.
Islamic law also encouraged manumission by imposing a duty to manumit slaves
as a means for expiation of various sins. Islamic law further instituted a reduced
evidentiary burden to prove acts of manumission, so that even ambiguous
language-regardless of subjective intent-could be sufficient to result in the
manumission of a slave. Finally, Islamic law has often manumitted slaves as a
remedy for abuse of a slave by a master. The pro-liberation policy of Islamic law
toward slavery was expressed in the legal principle that "the Lawgiver looks
forward to freedom., 2 ' Accordingly, an absolute prohibition of slavery does not
raise a question of conscience for Muslims and would arguably further the
Islamic view of the good, even if traditional Islamic law did not consider slavery
to be a categorical evil.

27

28

husband is well-known for piety); al-Hattab, 4 Mawahib aljail at 15 (cited in note 22) (wife is
presumed to be truthful in a dispute with husband regarding the proper characterization of the
husband's action).
In this case, the justifications of the prohibition or the regulation would be important from the
perspective of a traditionalist Muslim. Even if he could comply in good faith with the prohibition,
he may not be able to accept a particular justification of that prohibition on controversial
metaphysical grounds, in which case he would be forced to express opposition to the rule in
question, at least to the extent that the legislation was deemed to be the manifestation of a moral
doctrine that the traditionalist Muslim believes to be false.
For example, in a case where a plaintiff alleges that another person is her slave, but lacks direct
evidence for that claim, the defendant is exempted from the otherwise applicable evidentiary
obligation to swear an oath denying the plaintiffs claim on the grounds that "the law presumes
the freedom of people, so the plaintiffs claim that the defendant is a slave is contrary to the law's
presumption of freedom and the lawgiver's desire for freedom, thus rendering the claim very
weak indeed, with the result that the defendant need not swear an oath denying it." AI-Sawi, 4
Bulghat al-salik at 219 (cited in note 26).
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Similar arguments can be made with respect to a prohibition of polygamy.
While legally permissible, it was nevertheless disfavored, and Islamic law
enforced contractual protections against polygamy. A very common example of
such a term was a provision called tamlik. Tamlik was a general contractual
device of delegation, pursuant to which a husband could delegate to his wife the
power to divorce in the event a certain contractually specified condition
occurred. For example, a wife could bargain for the right to a divorce in the
event that the husband was absent from the marital home for a specific period
of time.29 This same strategy could be used to provide a wife the right to a
divorce in the event that her husband took another wife,3" the right to force the
divorce of the second wife,3' or to force the manumission or sale of a concubine
acquired by the husband.3 2 Another rule prohibiting and criminalizing secret
marriages also operated to protect the interests of a first wife.33 Accordingly, a
prohibition of polygamy-so long as based on political conceptions and not
comprehensive moral doctrines-would be consistent with a traditional
Muslim's normative commitments.34
With respect to marital discipline, while Islamic law recognizes a husband's
conditional and qualified right to discipline his wife, it also subjects him to
liability for injuries he inflicts on her. The law of evidence, moreover, generally
requires a husband to prove, as an affirmative defense to a wife's charge of
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David S. Powers, Women and Divorce in the Islamic West, 1 Hawwa 29, 39 (2003). Indeed, in the case
cited by Powers, the contract even specified the evidentiary burden the wife would need to meet
in order to exercise this right, which in this case was simply her willingness to swear an oath as to
his absence for the specified length of time.
Amira El-Azhary Sonbol, History of Mamage Contracts in Egypt, 3 Hawwa 159, 167 (2005).
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Id at 168.
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Id. See also Mohammad H. Fadel, Reintepreling the Guardian'sRole in the Islamic Contract of Marage:
the Case of the Makki School, 3 J Islamic L 1, 24-25 (1998) (providing a translation of a model
Islamic marriage contract from eleventh century Muslim Spain illustrating tamlik provisions). See
also al-Dardir, 2 al-Sharh al-saghir at 595 (cited in note 17) (explaining that, because tamlik
conditioned on the husband marrying another woman is intended to protect the first wife from
the harm of polygamy, the husband cannot retract that delegation, in contrast to other cases in
which the husband has appointed an agent to effect a divorce solely on his behalf).
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AI-Dardir, 2 al-Sharh al-saghirat 382-83 (cited in note 17) (declaring secret marriages to be legally
void and subject to criminal punishment). A marriage was considered "secret" if the husband
asked the witnesses to conceal news of the marriage from others, even if that other is only one
person and even if only for a few days.

34

I am not the first to make this argument. Fazlur Rahman as well as a senior Ottoman-era jurist
made a similar argument; for the latter, see Charles Kurzman, ed, Modernist Islam, 1840-1940: A
Sourcebook 188-191 (Oxford 2002). Tunisian legislation prohibiting polygamy, however, is an
example of Islamic modernist legislation that violates pubic reason because the justification given
is theological, namely, that the Qur'an, properly read, prohibits polygamy, rather than being
rooted in public reason, for example, that it is harmful to women or children. Fazlur Rahman, A
Survy of ModerniZation of Muslim Family Law, 11 Intl J Middle E Studies 451, 457 (1980).
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abuse, that his use of force satisfied the requirements of legitimate discipline. In
the absence of such evidence, he is presumed to have used unlawful violence
against his wife, thus necessitating both monetary compensation for the wife and
her right to divorce. Islamic law also reduced the evidentiary burden of a wife
claiming spousal abuse by admitting hearsay evidence in such cases3" and by
permitting witnesses to testify based on circumstantial evidence of abuse.36
Finally, moral teachings stating that only the worst of men beat their wives
confirm the ethically tenuous status of the husband's right to discipline his wife
within the Islamic tradition. For these reasons, a legal prohibition of such a right
does not raise any ethical problems for a traditional Muslim.3"
C. ISLAMIC LAW, PUBLIC REASON, AND QUESTIONS OF FACT
The second category of rules of Islamic substantive law that do not
conform to the requirements of public reason involves rules that could
nevertheless be made consistent with public reason simply by revising an
obsolete factual assumption.38 In other words, some rules of Islamic law are
based on factual assumptions that are no longer true, even if they might have
been true in the past. For instance, one such rule relates to the discriminatory
norms applied to the legal emancipation of male and female children.39
According to pre-modern Islamic law, a male attains full legal capacity
(rushd) simultaneously with physical puberty. A female, however, remains a
minor (and therefore under the control of a guardian) until she can prove that
she has attained the skills necessary for independence. Ordinarily, females
35
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A1-Dardir, 4 al-Sharh al-saghir at 283 (cited in note 17) (permitting witnesses to testify to abuse
based on widespread second-hand reports of the spouse's abuse) and Burhan al-din Ibrahim b.
Muhammad b.Farhun (known as Ibn Farhun), 1 Tabsirat al-hukkam 281 (Dar al-kutub al-'ilmiyya
undated) (same).
Farhun, 2 Tabsirat al-hukkam at 12 (cited in note 35) (circumstantial evidence permitted in cases of
claims of abuse because that is all that is generally possible to obtain).

37

38

39

As Fazlur Rahman has noted, such an approach does not solve the theological problems inherent
in the belief in a divine text whose teachings are taken to contemplate norms that go beyond its
provisions. Fazlur Rahman, Islamic Modernism: Its Scope, Method and Alternatives, 1 Intl J Middle E
Studies 317, 330-31 (1970).
Islamic law does not require deference be given to factual findings of previous generations of
jurists.
For a more detailed discussion on the rules of capacity and the interaction of these rules with the
autonomy of females in contracting their marriage, see Fadel, 3 J Islamic L at 8-11 (cited in note
32). See also Muhammad b. Idris al-Shafi'i, 3 al-Umm (Chapter on the Legal Incapacity of Those
Who Have Attained the Age of Majority) (included in the Enfclopedia of Islamic jurisprudence (cited
in note 19)) (explaining that religiosity and care in the management of property apply to both
males and females with respect to obtaining full legal capacity and that females generally require
more time than males to obtain the experience necessary to manage their affairs since they
customarily do not attend to the market from an early age as do boys).
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tended not to attain full legal capacity until after the consummation of their first
marriage. A woman could, however, obtain a judicial declaration of capacity
(tarshia), in which case she would enjoy full contractual capacity, including full
capacity with respect to marriage contracts. The legal justification for this
discriminatory rule, however, is non-theological and is based instead on a
stereotype of women being prone to waste their property.
The fact that women are given an opportunity to present evidence
demonstrating their competence in managing property-in which case they are
recognized as individuals with full legal capacity over their affairs including
marriage and divorce-confirms the non-theological origin of this rule.
Accordingly, this rule can be made to conform to public reason simply be
revising the obsolete stereotype. Moreover, because such a revision would not
implicate any theological presumptions, there is no reason to think that Islamic
law would have a principled objection to overturning this empirical
presumption. 4' The fact that many Muslim-majority states offer equal access to
education to both boys and girls suggests that the empirical basis for this
stereotype should no longer apply. This would be an especially easy change to
make given the spread of compulsory public education on a gender neutral basis
throughout the Islamic world. Whatever empirical basis might have once existed
in the past to justify treating males and females differently with respect to the
capacity to manage their property, the presumption should no longer apply.
The same strategy could be used to justify the revision of other rules that
are in conflict with international human rights norms and public reason, such as
rules permitting the marriage of minors. Interference with minors' autonomy
interests in these cases was justified on empirical grounds. Whereas pre-modern
jurists believed that marriage was necessary to secure a child's well-being,
especially for a female child, radically changed social circumstances now allow
children, including girls, the opportunity for material security outside of
marriage, at least for all but the poorest and least-developed Muslim-majority
jurisdictions. Accordingly, the grounds on which the interference in children's
autonomy interests had been justified as a general matter no longer exist.

40

Indeed, there is evidence that pre-modern Moroccan jurists had already dispensed with this
discriminatory presumption and recognized the full contractual capacity of females as arising
simultaneously with puberty, just as they did with males. Muhammad al-Banani, 3,5 Hashyat albananion the margin of Sharh al-Zarqawi 'a/arnukhtasarsidi Kha/il 297 (Dar al-fikr undated). It is not
clear, however, whether they then applied the presumption of full legal capacity of females to
issues of marriage.
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D. MANDATORY RULES OF ISLAMIC LAW, THE RIGHT TO FREE
EXERCISE OF RELIGION, AND PUBLIC REASON
The third category of problematic rules consists of discriminatory rules that
are grounded in theological justifications, and therefore cannot be revised by
simply correcting an erroneous factual assumption. In these circumstances, a
change in theological doctrine would be required in order for the rule of Islamic
law to be brought into line with public reason. Failing that, the question
becomes whether public reason would permit Muslims to adhere voluntarily to
that discriminatory rule as a legitimate expression of religious freedom. This
section will use the example of the inheritance law to address the problems
related to this category of legal rules.
Relying on express provisions of the Qur'an, Muslim jurists developed
elaborate rules of intestate succession. A fundamental rule was that a male heir
receives twice the share of a similarly situated female heir."' The fact that the
Qur'an made any provision at all for women to inherit was a radical departure
from pre-Islamic practice in Arabia, where women did not inherit property 42 and
where widows themselves could be inherited.4 3 Muslim modernists such as
Fazlur Rahman have argued that the rule of the Qur'an should not be
interpreted as an eternally binding rule of law, but instead should be viewed in
the context of numerous reforms that the Qur'an made improving the overall
social status of women. On this reading of Qur'anic legislation, the aim of the
Qur'an with respect to social relations was one of equality, but its specific rules
represented the practical limit of how far such reforms could be taken in light of
the circumstances of seventh-century Arabia. "
The notion that gender equality is a Qur'anic teaching is supported by
numerous verses of the Qur'an stressing the spiritual equality of men and
women. This assumption of equality has also made its way into legal discourse
insofar as jurists have assumed that in the absence of evidence to the contrary,
legal texts-whether granting rights or imposing obligations-apply equally to
both men and women.4" Even in the context of intergenerational transfer of
41

Qur'an 4:11, 4:176. Accordingly, a son receives twice the share of the daughter, and the father
receives twice the share of the mother.
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C.E. Bosworth, et al, eds, VII The Enyelopaedia of Islam 106 (Brill 1993).
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Qur'an 4:19.
Consider Rahman, 11 Intl J Middle E Studies 451 (cited in note 34) (describing Qur'anic reforms
regarding women's rights as being limited by "realistic" conditions while also laying out "moral
guidelines" that could lead to further reform subsequent to when more modest legal reforms are
accepted).
See Shihab al-Din al-Qarafi, 5 Nafais al-usulfl sharb al-mahsul 2386 (Makkah: Maktabat Nizar
Mustafa al-Baz 1997) ('Adil Ahmad 'Abd al-Mawjud and 'Ali Muhammad Mu'awwad, eds)
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wealth, inheritance laws were not the only relevant body of law. Though the laws
of intestate succession mandated a discriminatory rule regarding distribution of
the estate's property, a norm of equality governed lifetime dispositions; that is,
inter vivos gifts. Finally, Islamic law also permitted the use of trusts as a vehicle
to transfer wealth from one generation to another, and the settlor of a trust was
given almost complete freedom in determining who would and would not
benefit from the trust's assets.46 Interestingly, Malik B. Anas, the eponym of the
Maliki school, prohibited the formation of trusts for the exclusive benefit of
sons, but had no objection to trusts formed for the exclusive benefit of
daughters. Accordingly, a Muslim modernist may cite rules such as these in
support of a reading of the Qur'anic verses on inheritance as establishing a floor
rather than a ceiling on a woman's inheritance rights.
Nevertheless, such a reading-even if theologically permissible-is not
textually compelled, and, accordingly, the traditional reading remains defensible
as a matter of Islamic religious doctrine. To pass a law mandating equality in the
distribution of assets, therefore, would not satisfy the justifications required by
public reason insofar as either justification would suggest that the views of
traditionalist Muslims are simply wrong. If, however, the relevant law of descent
permitted traditionalist Muslims to opt out of a mandatory rule of equality in
favor of traditional Islamic law of inheritance, the implication that traditionalist
Muslim doctrine is morally wrong or repugnant to public reason would be
dispelled. Accordingly, the resolution of the question turns on whether
accommodating a traditionalist Muslim's desire to follow the discriminatory
prescriptions of the traditional Islamic law of inheritance would be a permissible
departure from public reason's equality norm.
There are two reasons to believe that public reason would permit such an
accommodation. First, granting the accommodation in this circumstance would
further the rational self-interest of the testator. As a traditionalist Muslim, she
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("women are like men for all [rules of] the Divine Law except where there is [textual] evidence [to
the contrary]"). Al-Qarafi, an Egyptian theologian who died in the latter half of the thirteenth
century, criticizes Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, a Central Asian theologian who died in the first decade of
the thirteenth century and who authored the text on which al-Qarafi is commenting, for holding
the view that God did not intend for women to understand revelation directly, but that they
should instead be taught religion at the hands of religious scholars. Instead, al-Qarafi argued that
the same rule applies to both men and women, namely, whoever has the intellectual ability to
understand revelation is obliged to understand it, while those lacking that capacity, whether men
or women, are excused from this obligation.
The basic doctrine of trust law was that "the words of the settlor [set forth in the trust deed] are
like the words of the Lawgiver." AI-Dardir, 4 al-Sharh al-saghirat 120 (cited in note 17). See also
Aharon Layish, The Famiy Waqf and the Shari Law of Succession in Modern Times, 4 Islamic L & Soc
352, 356 (1997) (noting the flexibility of Islamic trust law and its usefulness as a device to
circumvent mandatory rules of inheritance law).
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could be concerned that by failing to ensure that her estate is distributed to her
heirs according to Islamic law, she will be committing a sin for which she will be
held accountable to God. Second, it appears that such an accommodation would
be "reasonable" from a Rawlsian perspective-that is to say, it does not involve
using the coercive power of the state to impose one's own view of the good
upon others who do not share that view.
There may be circumstances, however, where application of a
discriminatory norm by a private person for religious reasons-such as
enforcing the discriminatory provisions in the will of a traditionalist Muslimcould violate concerns of public reason. These considerations may provide
independent grounds, other than a commitment to gender equality, on which the
state could legitimately reject a request for a religious accommodation in the
form of an exemption from a gender-neutral inheritance law. One such possible
circumstance would be if a legal heir would be left destitute if the decedent's
request for a traditionalist accommodation was given, but would not if the
jurisdiction's rules of inheritance were applied.4 7 Another reason to believe that
granting such an accommodation in the case of a traditionalist Muslim is
otherwise consistent with the norms of public reason is that a traditionalist
Muslim can point to numerous Islamic theological doctrines that affirm the
moral equality of men and women, as well as other legal doctrines that treat
males and females equally, such that there is little risk that granting such an
accommodation could reasonably be viewed as furthering a view of the good
that is fundamentally "unreasonable" in a Rawlsian sense.
The accommodation argument could also potentially resolve the problem
of the hudud. As previously noted, the justification for the hudud penalties is
religious, insofar as they function as a means for a sinner to expiate his sin. 48 For
this reason, non-Muslims were not subject to the hudud unless the penalties used
in connection with the hudud were also deemed to further a secular interest, for
example, protecting property or security in the case of crimes such as theft or
highway robbery. This suggests that Islamic jurisprudence recognizes-at least
for non-Muslims-an exemption from the hudud penalties on the theory that
non-Muslims obtain no spiritual benefit from having such penalties applied to
them. To the extent that Islamic law also applied these penalties to non-Muslims
then, it did so for prudential reasons, not theologically motivated ones.
47
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Indeed, there is an analogous rule in the Maliki law of inheritance. In circumstances where the
decedent dies leaving only daughters but the daughters have a paternal uncle, the ordinary rule
provides that the daughters share two thirds of the estate equally, and the paternal uncle takes the
remaining third. In circumstances where the public treasury is in disarray, however, the rule
changes to provide that the daughters share in the entire estate and the paternal uncle gets
nothing.
See Fadel, The True, the Good and the Reasonableat *89 n 239 (cited in note 8).
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Accordingly, recognition of the applicability of international human rights law to
preclude the use of the hudud against non-Muslims should not raise any
theological difficulties for traditionalist Muslims.
The same argument should apply to dissident Muslims who do not
voluntarily submit to the hudud penalties. In the case of a recalcitrant Muslim,
application of the religiously motivated penalty does not further any interest of
the individual defendant, since with respect to that defendant, the salvific
benefits of the penalty are not achieved. In this circumstance, application of the
hudud penalty can only be justified on prudential grounds as a means to further a
secular interest (for example, the protection of property in the case of the
punishment of a thief). If the punishment is being applied for prudential
reasons, however, it should not be problematic to treat a dissenting Muslim in
the same manner as Islamic law would treat a non-Muslim. Accordingly, Islamic
law should be able to countenance revising the scope of the hudud penalties so
that they are applicable only to persons who specifically consent to the
application of the hudud punishment.4 9
If the hudud were to be applied only to those individuals who specifically
consented to those penalties, they would arguably be consistent with the
requirements of public reason, assuming that the state can ascertain that the
person in fact specifically consented to the punishment in question."0 As a
49
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The detailed arguments from Islamic law as to why limiting the applicability of the hudud penalties
to those who specifically consent to the punishment would be a reasonable internal doctrinal
development are beyond the scope of this Article. Such a rule would be consistent, however, with
the high evidentiary standards usually required before the hudud penalties could be applied and
with the fact that confessions could be retracted at any time, including at the time the penalty is
imposed. Finally, prominent Muslim legal authorities refused to apply the mandatory penalty for
drinking alcohol to those Muslims who believed that this penalty was limited to those who drank
grape wine, although they did leave open the possibility of punishing them for prudential reasons.
In short, it is not an unreasonable interpretation of Islamic law to conclude that the hudud
penalties should apply only to those who subjectively consent to them.
Were a state to offer this option, it would obviously have to impose substantial procedural
protections to ensure that the person is acting freely and is not under undue pressure from other
third parties. Assuming these procedural requirements are satisfied, the hudud penalties that are
limited to lashes should not raise any difficulties. Stoning presents a unique problem because the
person subject to stoning, by virtue of the finality of the penalty, is essentially foreclosing her
future self from questioning her present self's commitments. Amputation of the hand also results
in a permanent disability, but does not foreclose the person from rationally revising her
conception of the good in the future, and, accordingly, is less problematic than stoning but more
problematic than lashes. In this case, the social costs of the amputee, however, would have to be
borne by the Muslim community and not the state. The timing of the consent would also be a
question, but from the perspective of Islamic law, it would not be problematic were public reason
to conclude that such consent must be revocable. Islamic evidentiary law permitted defendants
who were convicted of hudud crimes based on confession to retract their confessions without
penalty prior to the execution of the punishment, and thus the revocability of consent would not
seem to raise a problem from the perspective of Islamic law. As a practical matter, however, I do
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general matter, it is rational for a devout Muslim to submit to a mandatory
penalty because expiation of sin implicates her salvation interest. By submitting
to the mandated penalty for drinking wine, for example, the believer is rationally
furthering her goal of obtaining salvation. It is also reasonable to permit the
application of the hudud to this class of persons, since in this case state power is
not being used to coerce their compliance with rules that are inconsistent with
their conception of the good.
This suggests that the most powerful argument against the application of
the hudud is not that they are cruel and unusual punishments because such an
argument would have no purchase among believing Muslims. The more
persuasive argument against the application of the hudud, from a Muslim
perspective, would be based on religious freedom, focusing on the absence of a
religious benefit to the defendant in cases where she is a dissenter. Whether that
dissenter is a Muslim or non-Muslim should be irrelevant in light of the fact that
by rejecting the normative status of the hudud penalty, the penalty loses its
religious function and, thus, achieves only secular purposes. Accordingly, it
should be subject to all applicable limitations on lawful secular punishments,
including those of international human rights laws.
E. MANDATORY RULES OF ISLAMIC LAW THAT ARE
REPUGNANT TO PUBLIC REASON
This last category includes rules that traditional Islamic law deemed
mandatory, but could not be permitted under any notion of accommodating the
free exercise of religion because the substance of the rule mandates violation of
the freedom of the rights of others. Such rules include those requiring
discriminatory treatment of non-Muslims and those punishing Muslims who
renounce Islam. Most Muslim-majority states have abolished de jure
discrimination against non-Muslim citizens in connection with establishing
modern legal systems, and only the most extreme Islamist groups call for
reintroducing pre-modern discriminatory legal norms into the legal systems of
modern Muslim states. Apostasy, however, remains politically and legally salient,
as evidenced by recent high profile cases involving issues of apostasy even in
non-Islamist regimes such as Egypt and Malaysia. Moreover, to the extent that
Muslims discard the criminalization of apostasy, the rights of non-Muslims
within Muslim-majority jurisdictions would be made more secure. It is also not
unreasonable to believe that a principled resolution of the issue of apostasy
under Islamic law would also lead to the resolution of a host of other rules
not believe that a large number of Muslims, if any, would volunteer to have the hudud penalties
applied to them. Nevertheless, it is important to consider the hypothetical of the Muslim who
wishes to undergo such a penalty on free exercise of religion grounds.
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within pre-modern Islamic law that restrict freedom of thought, and thereby also
reduce the conflict between Islamic law and human rights norms protecting the
freedom of thought.
While Muslim theologians and jurists have not been able to overturn
orthodox doctrine on the treatment of apostates, many leading twentieth-century
Islamic modernist scholars-including prominent figures such as Selim elAwa-have rejected the traditional criminalization of apostasy, arguing that it is
fundamentally inconsistent with Islam's commitment to free acceptance of
religious truth based on rational conviction."1 Instead, they read the normative
texts that appear to contemplate execution of apostates as referring to acts of
treason rather than a change in a person's conviction. While one may question
whether the modernist reading of the apostasy rules is a plausible reading of the
Islamic legal tradition, human rights advocates should not shy away from using
the opening provided by Muslim modernist scholars to criticize the governments
of Muslim-majority regimes that continue to make concepts such as apostasy
relevant to their legal systems, even if that relevance is limited solely to civil
matters. 52
IV. CONCLUSION
It appears likely that for the foreseeable future, both the norms of
international human rights law as well as of Islamic law will gain importance. It
is accordingly imperative that legal scholars develop a framework that would
permit a principled reconciliation between the commitments of each tradition.
Under a Rawlsian theory of public reason, robust guarantees of freedom of
religion should reasonably protect the interests of Muslims who are concerned
with preserving the integrity of their way of life, while at the same time,
respecting the rights of non-Muslims as well as dissenting Muslims. This
synthesis would require Islamist political movements to abandon the goal of
establishing "perfectionist" Islamic states which seek to enforce the Islamic
51
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Consider Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Freedom of Expression in Islam 93-96 (Cambridge 1997)
(discussing ancient and modern dissenters to the rule criminalizing apostasy from Islam and
attributing to el-Awa the view that revising this doctrine is "urgent").
See, for example, the notorious Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd divorce case in Egypt, where the
defendant was judicially divorced from his wife on the grounds that his writings were tantamount
to apostasy in an action brought by third-party plaintiffs. Court of First Instance, Giza, 27.1.1994,
case no 591/1993 (dismissing the action for lack of standing); Court of Appeals Cairo, 14.6.1995,
appeal no 287/judicial year 111 (reversing the lower court and concluding that the defendant was
an apostate and on that basis divorcing the defendant from his wife); Egyptian Court of
Cassation, 5.8.1996, appeals no 475, 478, 481/judicial year 65 (upholding decision of Cairo Court

of Appeals). See also Killian Biilz, Submitting Faith to Judidal Scruliny through the Family Trial 'The
Abu Zayd Case," 37 Die Welt des Islams 135 (1997) (discussing the context of this case in the
Egyptian legal system).
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conception of the good-in whole or in part-on individuals through the use of
state power. The limitations of public reason, however, would also require a
revision of the rhetoric of human rights. It is not clear that either human rights
advocates or Islamist movements or Muslim-majority governments would be
willing to accept this synthesis. Theoretically, however, the method I have
outlined in this Article is responsive to the major concerns of each group
without requiring either side to abandon its fundamental moral commitments.
Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that a Rawlsian approach could be a useful
means of resolving the growing conflict between international human rights law
and Islamic law.
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